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I. INTRODUCTION
This essay introduces our fourth issue of Privacy Law Year in
Review. With two scholarly articles and thirteen notes by law
students, this issue is the most comprehensive source for current
developments in privacy law, focused on the United States. We hope
this issue can be a valuable desktop resource for people who work on
the challenging array of information privacy topics.
The area of online advertising has drawn particular attention
recently, both in the United States and the European Union. The
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") has continued to highlight issues
of behavioral profiling in online advertising,' while the European
Union has emphasized its concerns about privacy and search engines.
Major online advertisers have merged, increasing the size of their
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databases. A growing area of discussion is the extent to which
Internet Protocol addresses-the basic information transmitted in
each web session-should be considered "personally identifiable
information" or "personal data" subject to data protection rules.
In significant ways, the debates about online advertising have
become the vehicle for broader debates about how privacy will be
protected in the future. The increasing detail available to online
advertisers and search engines foreshadows similar issues for other
technologies, such as locational information that is becoming feasible
to track through Global Positioning Systems and cell phones. In the
United States, the online advertising debates might be a preview for
cross-sectoral privacy rules- online activities and advertising have
both become so pervasive that governance of online advertising could
merge into comprehensive governance of privacy.
One other major theme is how identification and authentication
will be managed going forward. Under President Bush, the federal
government pushed for new identity systems such as REAL ID
(minimum standards for state driver's licenses) and E-Verify
(electronic confirmation of eligibility for employment). At the same
time, there were numerous policy initiatives to address identity theft,
including state laws requiring notice of data breaches, and the new
federal "Red Flags" rule. Identity and authentication will continue to
raise difficult technical, policy, and political issues in the coming
years, and one of the authors of this essay worked on a major study in
2008 that proposed how authentication programs should be assessed
in the new administration.2
Part II of this essay describes the structure of Privacy Law Year in
Review. Part III summarizes the articles in this issue written by
scholars. Part IV then presents the key points from each of the
thirteen student notes.
II. THE TASKS OF PRIVACY LAW YEAR IN REVIEW
The principle goal of Privacy Law Year in Review is to create a
trustworthy, non-ideological, and clearly written annual review of
developments in privacy law, with a focus on developments affecting
the United States. It is one of three annual issues of I/S: A Journal of
Law and Policy for the Information Society. Peter Swire is Faculty
Editor for this issue and co-author of this essay. Peter Shane, also of
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the Moritz College of Law, is overall Faculty Editor of the Journal.
Other current I/S issues include "Patent Reform" and a Celebration of
the loth Issue of I/S. Information about I/S is available at
http://www.is-journal.org. For the second year, Martha Landesberg
is co-author of this Introductory Essay and has co-supervised the
student notes with Peter Swire. Martha Landesberg is Associate
Director for Privacy Policy and Education in the Privacy Office of the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
As was true in previous years, we are delighted this issue of
Privacy Law Year in Review will be distributed to all members of the
International Association of Privacy Professionals ("IAPP"). Under
the leadership of Trevor Hughes, the IAPP has grown rapidly in recent
years and now numbers over 5000 members. Privacy Law Year in
Review is distributed in hard copy to all IAPP members and members
can also sign up for passwords to get online access to all I/S issues.3
We at Moritz continue to work closely with the IAPP to provide
high-quality content for privacy professionals, students, and scholars.
In 2007, IAPP published Information Privacy: Official Reference for
the Certzfied Information Privacy Professional. Peter Swire, Sol
Bermann, and others from Moritz wrote the first edition, which is the
official study material for the CIPP examination. The second edition
is now in late stages of edits. This year, for the first time, many of the
student authors took the CIPP examination in the course of working
on their notes.
Privacy Law Year in Review focuses especially on developments
from late 2007 through the early fall of 2008. Students began their
research in 2007 under the leadership of I/S Editor-in-Chief Erin
Wright and Privacy Issue Editors Megan Engle, Carla Scherr, and
Stephen Wolfson. Student work after March 2007 was under the
direction of I/S Editor-in-Chief Natalie Bennett and Privacy Issue
Editors Nathaniel Arden, Nicki Elgie, and Gena Miller Shelton. This
essay was completed in February 2009.
III. ARTICLES BY SCHOLARS IN THIS ISSUE
This issue features two articles by scholars that provide a
compelling mix of empirical research and analytic results, focusing on
the costs of reading privacy notices and research into data breach
notices.
3 For IAPP members who wish to activate their online access, contact Kimberly McNeill,
IAPP Membership Services Coordinator (207.351.1500 x133/kim@privacyassociation.org).
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Carnegie Mellon researchers Aleecia M. McDonald and Lorrie
Faith Cranor document under-appreciated costs of privacy notices.
Privacy protection in the United States has often been understood as a
"notice and choice" model- a website gives notice of its privacy
practices, and individuals then choose whether to provide their
personal information. This notice-based approach has some key
advantages, such as fostering efforts by organizations to define their
privacy practices and ensuring that the FTC has jurisdiction to enforce
against deceptive practices. Privacy notices might help develop a
market in privacy, by allowing consumers to choose among providers
based in part on the content of the privacy policy. In addition, basing
privacy enforcement on an organization's privacy policy reduces the
burden on regulators to promulgate rules that apply to diverse
companies with diverse business models.
The new empirical work by McDonald and Cranor poses this
question: "If website users were to read the privacy policy for each site
they visit just once a year, what would their time be worth?" The
answer is: a lot. This once-a-year read of privacy policies would have
a U.S. opportunity cost of over $650 billion.
The McDonald and Cranor findings pose a new challenge to
economists and others who believe that notice-based systems are the
best available way to protect privacy. Compared to other regulatory
approaches, notice-based systems appear less costly because they
avoid the problems that occur when regulators write less-than-
optimal rules about what data uses to permit. The McDonald and
Cranor findings, however, emphasize the costs to consumers of
reading privacy policies. These are economic costs to notice-based
approaches that may offset some or all of the economic benefits.
The McDonald and Cranor findings may also be useful in broader
regulatory debates about the role of notice. Notice-based approaches
are a close intellectual fit with "neoclassical economics," which
assumes that individuals are rational actors who maximize utility.
The more recent movement called "behavioral economics" has focused
on cognitive biases and other empirical measurements of ways that
individuals process information and make decisions. In addition to
the existing literature about behavioral economics, the McDonald and
Cranor findings show another limit of notice-based approaches- the
economic value of the time to make a decision may be worth more
than making a good decision. In such circumstances, individuals will
predictably make many sub-optimal decisions. Regulatory
approaches that rely less on notice may thus be more desirable than
hitherto appreciated.
Computer security experts Matt Curtin and Lee Ayres have
contributed a two-part article about data breaches to this issue: Using
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Science to Combat Data Loss: Analyzing Breaches by Type and
Industry. The first part presents an improved taxonomy for types of
data breaches, in the hopes that data will increasingly become
available in forms that will assist security researchers in identifying
what responses are appropriate. The second part describes
statistically significant differences between sectors in the types of
breaches that occur. This sort of diagnosis of types of breaches is
potentially extremely useful- it can highlight what sorts of problems
plague different sectors, leading to a more effective set of security
responses.
The Curtin and Ayres statistics suggest that quite different
problems exist in different sectors. The Health Care and Social
Assistance sector reported a higher proportion of lost and stolen
computing hardware, but reported an unusually low proportion of
compromised hosts. This data suggests that outside hackers have not
been a key problem in the health care sector, but that hard-disk
encryption or other measures to reduce the harms from lost
equipment may be a priority. Educational Services reported, by
contrast, a high proportion of compromised hosts, but low rates of
insider misconduct or lost equipment. These findings highlight the
challenges for universities in how to maintain an open and
experimental attitude in an era where outside hackers may
disproportionately target university computers for launching system-
wide attacks.
In the Public Administration sector, the proportion of
compromised host reports was below average, but the proportion of
processing errors was high. These findings may be consistent with a
view that the government sector has sought to be fairly strict on
security, but the sector struggles to have the resources and personnel
sufficient to avoid processing mistakes. Finally, the Finance and
Insurance sector showed the smallest proportion of processing errors,
but the highest proportion of insider misconduct. It is comforting to
learn that processing errors are low in this sector, because errors in
financial accounts by definition are often expensive and harmful. At
the same time, the findings reinforce the need for strict internal
controls in this sector against insider attacks. Banks are where the
money is, and modern bank theft can often be achieved most
effectively by internal finagling of accounts.
The Curtin and Ayres article highlights the value of data breach
statutes for research in the field of computer security. New statutes
and regulations about data breach should likely be crafted in ways that
will create usable data for researchers. Improved research, in turn,
will enable different sectors to respond more effectively to the
distinctive threats they face.
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IV. AN OVERVIEW OF PRIVACY LAW IN 2008
The notes in this year's Privacy Year in Review are grouped into
the following four categories: identity and data loss; online and
locational privacy; medical and genetic privacy; and international
issues.
A. IDENTITY AND DATA Loss
Three notes examine issues of proof of identity and identity theft:
(1) the federal E-Verify program, which employers increasingly use to
check eligibility for employment; (2) new legal rules concerning
identity theft, including data freeze legislation and the "Red Flags"
rule; and (3) recent developments in data breach notice, where an
important rationale for the notice is to reduce identity theft.
Lizzette Romero's note considers the privacy issues posed by E-
Verify, the system administered by the U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Service ("USCIS") that enables employers to
electronically determine newly-hired employees' eligibility for
employment. Employers submit information in an employee's 1-9
Form (including name, date of birth, Social Security number, and
citizenship status) to E-Verify, which compares that information
against the Social Security Administration database and Department
of Homeland Security immigration databases and provides eligibility
information in real time. The system returns a Tentative Non-
Confirmation Notice ("TNC") for employees whose eligibility it cannot
immediately verify. Employees who receive a TNC are able to contest
it and seek correction of their records, and the law prohibits
employers from firing or taking other adverse measures against
employees based upon a TNC. Ms. Romero describes in detail how E-
Verify is designed to function, and discusses current concerns about
the program's efficacy, its vulnerability to misuse and abuse, and the
efforts underway to strengthen it.
The use of E-Verify has climbed in the recent past, with one
current estimate that about 100,000 employers use it out of seven
million employers in the United States.4 Participation is mandatory
for all federal agencies. Federal government contractors and
subcontractors were to be required to use the system as well, but the
4 See Jaikumar Vijayan, E-Verify Hiring Mandate Dropped from Stimulus Bill,





Department of Defense and the General Services Administration
recently delayed implementation of that requirement until May 2009,
pending the Obama administration's regulatory review. Eight states
currently require participation by at least some private-sector
employers (some states require all to participate), and more states
may follow their lead. As the note points out, the trend toward
broader use of E-Verify has highlighted the need to address several
key issues, not least of which are the burdens on both businesses and
employees faced with having to navigate the TNC process. Critics of
the system are concerned about the frequency with which eligible
workers, such as foreign-born U.S. citizens, receive TNCs and may
ultimately be denied employment, due to employer errors in entering
data into E-Verify, incorrect or outdated information in the databases
used by E-Verify, or other factors. While the precise extent of this
problem is a matter of debate, both the critics and USCIS recognize
the need to minimize these occurrences.
The note also discusses the potential for misuse of the E-Verify
system, and even outright fraud, by employers. Some of E-Verify's
critics are concerned that employers have fired, or taken other adverse
actions against, employees who receive a TNC, or have failed to inform
employees who receive a TNC about their right to have their records
corrected. Others are skeptical of the system's ability to ensure that
individuals who are in fact eligible for employment will not be
discriminated against on the basis of national origin. The fraudulent
use of Social Security numbers and alien numbers by employers (and
by some employees) participating in E-Verify is another ominous
development. Ms. Romero's note concludes with a discussion of
recent efforts to address these issues. Political debates about E-Verify
are likely to continue. For instance, the House version of the stimulus
bill at the beginning of the Obama administration would have
required participation in E-Verify by recipients of federal funding, but
the final version of the bill omitted that requirement.
Nicki Elgie's note addresses identity theft, which remains a
significant problem in the United States despite the Herculean efforts
of state legislators, state and federal agencies, the President's Identity
Theft Task Force, and consumer and business groups. The note
begins with a description of state laws that provide consumers the
right to have a "security freeze" placed upon their credit reports. Such
freezes are one way to thwart identity thieves who seek to obtain
credit reports under false pretenses or to open revolving credit
accounts (or to incur other debt) using stolen information. The note
briefly discusses bills pending in the Congress that would establish a
federal credit freeze regime.
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The note also analyzes the "Red Flags" rule promulgated jointly by
the FTC and the federal bank regulatory agencies, as required by the
Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003. The rule requires
financial institutions and creditors to identify specific practices,
behaviors, or patterns of activities that are indicative of identity
theft-"red flags"-and to implement policies and procedures to detect
and address them. As the note points out, the rule follows the
example of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Safeguards rule by allowing
businesses flexibility in designing their required programs. The note
concludes with an analysis of the likely efficacy of both the state freeze
laws and the Red Flags Rule in protecting consumers from identity
theft. Although the rule initially required companies to come into
compliance by November 1, 2008, the FTC has announced that it will
delay enforcement of the rule as to companies under its jurisdiction
until May 1, 2009.
Julie Heitzenrater's note provides an overview of recent state and
federal developments in breach notice legislation. It describes the
similarities and differences among various enactments and proposed
legislation in the states, including the types of personal information
protected, the conditions necessary to trigger notice to consumers,
standards for reporting breaches to the government, and the role of
encryption. The note also analyzes proposed state legislation that
would hold retailers liable to financial institutions and credit card
issuers for damages (e.g., the costs of canceling and reissuing credit or
debit cards, or refunds of unauthorized charges) resulting from a
breach of the retailers' databases. Some of these bills would impose
strict liability for a data breach; others would provide for liability
where a retailer has retained the card access security code, PIN
verification code, or magnetic stripe data after a transaction has been
approved, in violation of standards required of retailers by credit and
debit card issuers. The note summarizes the arguments in support of
and in opposition to these bills. The note also discusses federal
legislative efforts to date to move breach notification legislation, and
the market forces which, together with state legislation in this area,
are working as incentives to businesses to bolster the security of their
databases even in the absence of federal legislation.
B. ONLINE AND LOCATIONAL PRIVACY
Four notes this year address issues of online and locational
privacy: the scope of the term "personally identifiable information,"
and especially whether an Internet Protocol ("IP") address should be
subject to privacy protections; the ongoing debate about privacy and
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behavioral profiling; special rules that apply to children online,
including for social networking sites such as MySpace and Facebook;
and privacy issues that arise as global positioning systems become
more pervasive, so that the locations of individuals at least potentially
can become more widely tracked by public and private entities.
Frederick Lah's note reports on the current debate over whether
IP addresses should be considered "personally identifiable
information," or "personal data" in European parlance, and thus
subject to regulation under U.S. law and the E.U. Data Protection
Directive. The note begins with a discussion of the shift that is
occurring from mostly dynamic IP addresses, which are relatively
difficult for a website to link to an individual, to static IP addresses,
where the persistence of the IP address over time increases the
likelihood that a website will have the opportunity to identify an
individual. Broadband services often provide a static IP address for
each user, and the coming shift to the new protocol called "IPv6" will
increase the portion of users with static IP addresses. These
technological and market shifts strengthen the argument that IP
addresses can now be tied to individuals and thus constitute
"personally identifiable information" or "personal data."
The note examines the recent history of this topic in the European
Union. The E.U. Article 29 Working Party has, on several occasions,
expressed its view that IP addresses are "data related to an identifiable
person," and that Internet service providers must therefore treat them
as "personal data" subject to the protections of the E.U. Data
Protection Directive. In its April 2008 Opinion on Data Protection
Issues Related to Search Engines, the Working Party concluded that
search engines must also treat dynamic and static IP addresses as
"personal data" unless there is "absolute certainty" that individuals
with whom IP addresses are associated cannot be identified. The
European Union has yet to take official action on the Opinion, but it is
bringing pressure to bear on the search engines to shorten the period
of time for which they retain data (including IP addresses). The note
also examines the history of the issue in the United States,
highlighting the relevant definitions under various statutes and in
connection with behavioral advertising. The note concludes with a
summary of arguments both for and against extending privacy
protections to IP addresses.
James Schedwin's note discusses the ongoing debate about privacy
and behavioral advertising. This note defines important terms used in
online advertising, such as "contextual" advertising (different ads are
served based on where a user is on a website) and "behavioral"
advertising (different ads are served based on the historical activities
of a user or a user's device). The note examines the significant recent
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mergers among online advertising firms, which led most visibly to a
split FTC decision in late 2007 approving the merger of Google and
DoubleClick. The day the merger was approved, the FTC proposed
self-regulatory guidelines for online behavioral advertising. The note
analyzes the extensive public comments on these guidelines,
highlighting key issues going forward such as notice, choice, and the
use of sensitive data.
Another ongoing controversy has revolved around the measures
that should be implemented to protect the safety of children online.
The explosive growth of online social networking has led to concerns
about the safety of children who are drawn to "general audience" sites
such as MySpace and Facebook. Potential threats to young children in
these online environments range from the disclosure of sensitive
personal information (by children themselves, but also by others) to
cyber-bullying, exposure to pornography and other content unsuitable
for children, and child predation. Lawmakers, regulators, technology
experts, children's advocates, and the social networking sites
themselves have invested a great deal of time and effort to identify and
implement strategies to address these threats. Matthew Whitman's
note explores the issues posed by one such strategy: the use of age
verification as a means of limiting children's access to social
networking sites.
The note first discusses the January 2008 agreement between
MySpace and forty-nine state attorneys general-following a lengthy
investigation by some of these officials into sexual predators' activities
on the site-in which MySpace committed to a set of "Key Principles"
for protecting children from online predators and other threats in the
social networking space. Among other things, MySpace agreed to
create a registry of e-mail addresses provided by parents who want to
restrict their children's access to the site and to establish a task force
to develop automated age and identity authentication tools for use on
social networking sites in general. The agreement serves as the
springboard for the note's discussion of the technical and policy
arguments concerning the efficacy of age verification as a means of
enhancing children's safety online.
As the note points out, critics of age and identity verification see
centralized registries as tempting targets for hackers and identify
thieves. They believe that automated verification tools will be easily
circumvented by those who do not wish to be identified, including
internet-savvy children. Proponents of age verification are more
optimistic about the role technology can play in addressing these
issues. For example, the FTC has suggested that age verification
technology could serve as a substitute for the age-screening
techniques it had previously recommended (e.g., using a session
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cookie to prevent children from re-entering a site after having been
denied access because of their age).5 The Commission expressed the
hope that growing concerns about children's safety on social
networking sites would ultimately jump-start a market for age
verification technologies.
The note discusses alternatives to age verification for addressing
children's safety on social networking sites, including the use of
filtering software, resources such as Getnetwise.org and other
websites devoted to teaching online safety, and the role of parents in
monitoring their children's online activities. The note concludes by
highlighting the work that social networking sites are doing to prevent
young children from creating online profiles and to explore other
approaches, including age verification.
Sarah Rahter's note examines another realm where technology is
enabling tracking at a level of detail that historically was not possible.
With the spread of Global Positioning Systems ("GPS") in automobiles
and the pervasive use of cell phones, the location of individuals is
becoming knowable in ways that were technically impossible a decade
ago. Ms. Rahter focuses on the legal rules and policy for government
access to this treasure-trove of locational data. The note shows the
relatively weak protections under the Fourth Amendment for both
GPS and cell phone locational data, and examines key states, which
have varying levels of protection under their constitutions and
statutes. One area where courts have recently split is the legal
standard that the federal government must meet to gain access to cell
phone location records in real time. The note concludes with a
discussion of a new book by law professor Christopher Slobogin about
how the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted for these sorts of
high-technology searches.
C. MEDICAL AND GENETIC PRIVACY
Four notes this year explore issues of medical and genetic privacy.
Topics include: the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of
2008, which creates new federal non-discrimination requirements in
employment and health insurance; the rules applying to genetic
information used in scientific research; the legal status and policy
debate about keeping tissue samples for DNA testing; and issues of
5 FED. TRADE COMM'N, IMPLEMENTING THE CHILDREN'S ONLINE PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT: A
REPORT TO CONGRESS (2007),
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/coppa/o7COPPAReport-to-Congress.pdf.
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familial privacy for parents who oppose mandatory vaccination for
their children.
Jennifer Lee's note explains the history and implications of major
legislation enacted in 2008, the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act ("GINA"). The Human Genome Project of the
199os vastly increased the amount of genetic knowledge available to
researchers, and potentially to employers and insurers. Most states
passed at least some nondiscrimination laws in this area, but the laws
varied greatly and some had large loopholes. After nearly a decade of
debate, Congress passed GINA in May 2008. As the note explains,
GINA forbids employers and health insurers from discriminating on
the basis of genetic information. Major implementing rules are
scheduled to be announced in 2009, and debates may continue about
whether and how to extend GINA's protections to life insurers and
others.
Sarah Fendrick's note discusses federal and state privacy
protections for individuals whose genetic information is used in
scientific research. These research uses are generally outside the
scope of GINA. The note begins with an analysis of gaps in current
federal protections. The HIPAA Privacy Rule applies only to "covered
entities" such as medical providers. Researchers who use genetic
information, however, are often outside of the scope of HIPAA. A
legal gap also exists under the federal Common Rule, which requires
the informed consent of research subjects and approval by an
institutional review board for research within its scope. The Common
Rule, however, applies only to research funded or conducted by a
federal agency, and only to research that uses human subjects. Thus,
neither HIPAA nor the Common Rule applies to many types of
privately-funded genetic research (including research by many, if not
most, new biotech companies). State-funded research, or research on
genetic material but not human subjects, also falls outside of the
federal protections.
As Ms. Fendrick notes, twenty-nine states have taken steps to
address the gaps in federal coverage, but the state laws expressly
regulating the use of genetic information for genetic testing and other
purposes vary widely in the types of information they govern and in
the extent of the protections they require. Ms. Fendrick discusses the
pros and cons of various means short of legislation for addressing the
privacy of genetic information held in research databases, from de-
identification and other forms of data masking to using only research
subjects who consent to public disclosure of their data. The note
concludes by urging Congress to amend HIPAA by expressly defining
genetic material as Personal Health Information and to regulate
[Vol. 4:3536
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entities that are not currently subject to the HIPAA Rule or the
Common Rule.
Natalie Bennett's note concerns the privacy implications for the
current trend toward expanding state and federal databases of tissue
samples taken from criminal offenders for DNA testing. As scientific
understanding of DNA has progressed, so has appreciation for the
complexity of the personal information that can be derived from DNA.
As Ms. Bennett points out, DNA samples, unlike fingerprints, can do
more than simply place an individual at a crime scene- they also
provide insights into that individual's genetic history, kinship history,
and predisposition to certain medical conditions. The note examines
state and federal law governing DNA databases and federal court
decisions in cases challenging the collection and storage of genetic
information on Fourth Amendment grounds. The constitutional
challenges to such collection and storage have not succeeded to date.
The note also considers the arguments for and against creating a
national database of DNA samples from all individuals, and the role
that national standards could play in protecting information in DNA
databases from unauthorized access and misuse.
Ms. Bennett explores important issues underlying the debate
about the appropriate role of DNA databases. The states are the
primary sources of tissue samples that generate DNA profiles, and
state DNA databases are linked through a national indexing system.
Almost all states either require or permit the indefinite retention of
tissue samples, raising concerns about the vulnerability of information
in DNA databases to unauthorized access and misuse. Although both
state and federal law place certain limitations on access to and
disclosure of information in DNA databases, there is no uniform
standard for access or disclosure, or for retention of DNA samples.
The potential for "mission creep" is a closely related concern. Critics
of the expanded use of DNA databases argue that, in the absence of
mandatory privacy protections for sensitive DNA data, it is
increasingly likely that government and private-sector entities will
obtain access to this information for purposes unrelated to law
enforcement. Ms. Bennett presents the arguments for implementing
national legal standards for DNA databases, based on fair information
practice principles, including purpose specification and use limitation.
Kyla Kelch's note focuses on the legal and social arguments
associated with the growing phenomenon of parental opposition to
state laws mandating the vaccination of children against
communicable diseases. The note recounts the public health rationale
for vaccine mandates, and analyzes their implications for privacy. It
considers the various statutory exceptions that parents rely upon to
avoid immunizing their children (e.g., for religious, philosophical,
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and/or health reasons) as extensions of parental privacy rights. The
note also focuses on the current status of state immunization
information systems, or immunization registries, which serve as
repositories for children's personally identifiable information,
including vaccination histories, submitted by health care providers.
The note describes the privacy concerns raised by such systems,
including concerns about confidentiality and the potential that the
information will be used for purposes other than tracking
vaccinations. The note concludes with an analysis of a current
proposal for a national framework to strengthen the privacy
protections for state immunization registries.
D. INTERNATIONAL ISSUES
This year's two international notes focus on Japan and China.
Ryan Waggoner is combining his law studies with a master's degree in
Japanese law. His note compares privacy protections in the U.S. and
Japanese financial services sectors. He uses his Japanese language
skills to analyze key documents that have not been previously brought
to an English-language audience. Mr. Waggoner explains that the
Japanese approach lies between the U.S. sectoral and the E.U.
omnibus approach to privacy regulation. Japan enacted the economy-
wide Act for the Protection of Personal Information in 2003, but
actual implementation depends a great deal on sector-by-sector
guidelines issued by government ministries, including for the financial
sector. For the financial sector, the definition of "personal
information" applies essentially to any commercial actor that uses
financial personal information; this data-centered approach contrasts
with the U.S. approach, where some companies are "financial
institutions" covered by Gramm-Leach-Bliley, but where other
companies fall outside of the law's protection. Mr. Waggoner also
explains that the legal requirements concerning notice and opt-out are
stricter in Japan than under Gramm-Leach-Bliley.
Aimee Yang's note explains two major developments in China.
The first is that China appears to be on the path to creating a national
data protection regime. A first version of a draft law was completed in
2005, but that version was not implemented. Substantial discussions
about a national law have continued since that time, with twin goals:
enable China to trade more easily with European and other countries
that have strict data protection regimes and avoid undue burden on
economic growth. Ms. Yang's note explains recent developments in
the debates in China, and highlights key issues, including how to take
account of differing cultural attitudes toward "privacy."
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Ms. Yang's note also analyzes the ongoing international trade
dispute about whether China will develop encryption standards that
differ from global standards. Non-Chinese companies and
governments have expressed serious concerns about such Chinese-
specific standards. Any mandate within China to use Chinese-specific
encryption has been criticized as a protectionist measure in violation
of World Trade Organization rules. Use of China-specific standards
may also compromise data security- the Chinese standards have not
been approved as secure by international standards bodies. Global
information security may thus be weakened if Chinese-manufactured
components, included in many devices, are based on insecure
encryption. Although China has recently withdrawn the proposed
mandates, this issue may recur in the future.
V. CONCLUSION
At the time of this writing in February 2009, the new Obama
administration has said little about privacy. The initial economic
stimulus package included substantial amendments to the HIPAA
medical privacy rule, including new data breach notice requirements,
extension of the statute to business associates, and stricter rules in
areas such as marketing and accounting of disclosures to patients.
Most of the provisions, however, are derived from bills that were
considered in the House of Representatives in 2008. There are thus
few clues yet available about how the new administration will address
privacy issues.6
Looking forward, one over-arching question will be the extent to
which the United States will continue to rely on self-regulation to the
same extent as it has previously. Those who oppose government
regulation will point to the severe economic slump, and argue that
Congress and the new administration should be reluctant to put
additional burdens on business during hard economic times. On the
other hand, many observers have criticized self-regulation on Wall
Street, and have argued that the lack of mandatory federal rules
contributed to the financial collapse. President Obama was elected
with the promise of change, but the shape of such change in the
privacy realm remains difficult to predict.
6 The most detailed Obama campaign statement about privacy is contained in Barack
Obama: Connecting and Empowering All Americans through Technology and
Innovation, which is available at
http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/issues/technology/FactSheetInnovationandTech
nology.pdf (last visited March 29, 2009).
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